Deterrence Dynamics Between Pakistan and India: An Evolving Trajectory

According to Structural Realism, the global system is anarchic, and the structure of the international system determines the behavior of its actors. Taking this a step further, Neoclassical Realism argues that while the distribution of power in the international system shapes state behavior, internal factors also influence how states respond to external pressures. These internal factors include leaders’ perceptions (and misperceptions), state institutions and regime type, bureaucratic politics, and national identity and strategic culture.

Dr. Muhammad Shoaib Pervaiz,a prominent scholar in Security Studies and International Relations at UMT Lahore, has made significant contributions to critical security studies. Among his notable theoretical ideas ,often discussed in academic circles  is the concept of “Political Party’s Strategic Culture.” This framework extends the traditional analysis of strategic culture, usually applied to states and militaries, to political parties. According to Dr. Shoaib, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) strategic culture is civilizational, ideologically rigid, and majoritarian, rooted in the Hindutva worldview. This represents a shift from the Nehruvian strategic culture, which was secular, non-aligned, and institutionalist, toward a more assertive, identity-driven, and revisionist approach. Dr Shoaib’s work help us to understand the Indian policy and actions against Pakistan and to formulate Pakistani response.

Since Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan policies have become central to India’s domestic and foreign policy. Indian Muslims face systemic persecution, including lynching, murder, and rape by Hindu extremists, often with impunity. Under Modi, secular India has increasingly transformed into a hub of Hindu extremism and nativism. Pakistan, viewed as India’s antithesis, is vilified at the core. The Modi government has spared no effort to demonize Pakistan, investing billions in narrative-building campaigns to portray Pakistan as a pariah state deserving isolation. While falsely depicting India as a victim of Pakistan, Modi’s administration simultaneously supports and finances anti-Pakistan militant groups in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Since Prime Minister Modi came to power, his administration has consistently displayed hostility and antagonism toward Pakistan. In 2016, India claimed to have conducted a “surgical strike” across the Line of Control (LoC), which, upon closer examination, appeared to be a routine cross-border raid, common in the volatile dynamics of the LoC. The claim was largely dismissed by observers and perceived as a dramatized event meant to bolster domestic political support. To counter India’s narrative, the then Director General of ISPR invited international media to visit the alleged strike site, effectively challenging the credibility of the Indian account and turning the incident into an embarrassment for the Indian military establishment.

In 2019, following the Pulwama attack, the Indian Air Force carried out an airstrike in Balakot, allegedly targeting terrorist infrastructure. The strike, however, resulted in minimal damage, killing a crow and damaging a few trees. This marked the first time since the 1971 war that India targeted a settled area within Pakistan. Pakistan’s response was measured and professional, conducting airstrikes across the LoC without escalating to civilian targets.

However, this restrained response may have emboldened New Delhi. In May 2025, India activated its “salami slicing” strategy, conducting coordinated strikes on Muridke, Bahawalpur, and six other targets inside Pakistan. So confident was India in its position that its foreign minister publicly claimed that Pakistan had been notified prior to the strikes.

In the initial exchange, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) reportedly shot down six Indian fighter jets, including three Rafale aircraft. Nevertheless, India’s interpretation of Pakistan’s defensive posture, particularly PAF’s choice to engage without crossing the international border,was perceived as a sign of weakness.

Subsequently, India escalated by deploying drones, and on the night of 9–10 May, it crossed a critical threshold by launching BrahMos missiles, some of which targeted the Nur Khan Airbase. In response, Pakistan initiated a series of punitive strikes on 26 Indian targets from Occupied Kashmir to Indian state of Gujrat , demonstrating a significant escalation in the conflict. The intensity and precision of these retaliatory strikes reportedly compelled Prime Minister Modi to seek U.S. mediation, with President Trump intervening to facilitate a ceasefire.

The deterrence dynamics between Pakistan and India exhibit certain unique characteristics. A notable example is the episode of Operation Swift Retort in 2019, wherein Pakistan climbed the escalation ladder in response to Indian aggression. For the first time since the 1971 war, India conducted an aerial strike on Pakistan’s mainland settled area. In retaliation, Pakistan deliberately targeted areas across the Line of Control (LoC) in Indian-occupied Kashmir, executed precision bombings in proximity to Indian military positions, and then disengaged and returned without further escalation.

This calibrated response, however, was interpreted by India as a possible bluff, suggesting a perception that Pakistan lacked the capacity for engaging in a prolonged conventional conflict. As a result, following Operation Swift Retort, India issued threats of missile strikes on six strategic targets within Pakistan. In response, Pakistan identified eighteen Indian targets for counter-strikes. The situation de-escalated primarily due to the diplomatic intervention of China and the United States, which helped avert a broader conflict.

Despite this, India took Pakistan’s restraint, particularly its decision not to cross the international border in response to the Balakot strike, as an indication of strategic weakness. This perception had critical implications in the future trajectory of India’s military behavior.

In May 2025, this altered Indian perception manifested in a broader offensive. Whereas in 2019, India’s attack was limited to Balakot, this time Indian forces targeted settled areas within Azad Kashmir, as well as Bahawalpur and Lahore. Pakistan’s response, however, was markedly different. During the night of 7th and 8th, the Pakistan Air Force successfully downed six Indian aircraft.

Recognizing that India was operating under a misperception regarding the robustness of Pakistani deterrence, and in light of further provocations, including drone incursions and BrahMos missile attacks on Pakistan’s airbases, Pakistan opted to deliver a decisive physical response. In retaliation, missile strikes were conducted against Indian settled areas, resulting in the destruction of BrahMos missile stockpiles. Furthermore, Pakistan successfully targeted and destroyed S-400 air defense battery, as well as various military installations from Kashmir to Gujarat.

This escalation compelled India to unilaterally seek a ceasefire through the United States, marking a significant moment in the strategic calculus of both states. The key lesson derived from this sequence of events is that, in the context of Pakistan-India strategic relations, climbing the escalation ladder necessitates the delivery of physical punishment to the adversary. Only through such tangible responses does deterrence credibility solidify, preventing further escalation from the opposing side. Therefore, within the framework of bilateral deterrence, the element of punishment, particularly when climbing the escalation ladder, is indispensable for maintaining strategic stability and preventing miscalculations.